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POST-PARHAM REMEDIES: THE INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT OF MINORS IN VIRGINIA AFTER

PARHAM v. J.R.
Willis J. Spaulding*
I.

INTRODUCTION

[T]his case raises the most important question of every child's constitutional right to liberty, not only the liberty that includes freedom
from bodily restraint [citation omitted], but also the liberty that
includes the freedom of an ordinary, every-day child in these United
States of America-the freedom to live with mothers, fathers, brothers, and sisters in whatever the family abode may be; the freedom to
be loved and to be spanked; the freedom to go in and oat the door,
to run and play, to laugh and cry, to fight and fuss, to stand up and
fall down, to play childish games; the freedom to go to school and to
frolic with school mates; to go to Sunday school and church; the
freedom to watch and listen or not to watch and listen to television;
the freedom to buy candy at the corner store, the freedom to be a
normal child in a normal household cared for by normal parents.'
No court could go further than the three-judge district court in
J.L. v. Parham2 in recognizing the liberty interests of persons under
the age of majority,3 and extending to them the full procedural and
* Project Director, Mental Health Legal Studies Center, University of Richmond School
of Law; Member, Virginia State Bar; A.B., University of Michigan, 1970; J.D., University of
Virginia, 1976.
1. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Parham v. J.R.,
99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).

2. Id.
3. In Georgia the age of majority was eighteen. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-104 (1973). The challenged statute, § 88-503.1, independently specified eighteen as the age under which a person
was subject to parental commitment. While § 88-503.1(b) permitted children fourteen years
of age and older to admit themselves, only their parents (or the hospital) could discharge
them unless they were eighteen or older. This is a striking example of how a person might
lose one legal disability of childhood, the inability to consent to treatment, at a different age
than another, the inability to refuse treatment. See generally Katz, Schroeder, and Sedman,
Emancipating Our Children-Comingof Legal Age in America, 7 FAui. L.Q. 211 (1973).
Throughout this article "children" or "minors" will be used interchangeably to describe
persons under 18, the Virginia age of majority specified by VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1979).
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substantive protection of due process under the fourteenth amendment. The decision struck down a Georgia statue4 which had permitted parents or guardians to admit children to state mental hospitals without a pre-admission hearing.' The state was ordered to
release children so admitted within 60 days, unless they were recommitted pursuant to an existing juvenile coudrt procedure,6 or its
equivalent, which afforded the basic procedural due process safeguards of notice, an opportunity to be heard, and counsel.
While seven months earlier another three-judge district court in
Bartley v. Kremens' had set forth with greater specificity the procedural safeguards which Pennsylvania must afford minors institutionalized or proposed to be institutionalized in mental health and
mental retardation facilities, that court did not have occasion to
consider substantive due process limitations on the state's authority
to confine children in institutions.8 By contrast, the district court
in J.L. v. Parham found in the fourteenth amendment a restriction
on state authority which, although this point was to be overlooked
in the Supreme Court,' would exist regardless of the procedure followed in committing children. Relying on data provided by the
defendants, the district court found that about fDrty-six of the
plaintiff children could be treated in "a less drastic non-hospital
environment if such an environment were only available."' 0 The
district court ordered the defendants to build or otherwise provide
such treatment for those children." This constituted a major devel4. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1979). For comparable statutes in other states see Parham
v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2509 n.20; for state-by-state analysis see J. WILSON, THE RIGHTS OF
MINORS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM, Appendix B (1978). But see infra note 14 for decisions
overturning or modifying some of these statutes.
5. This form of voluntary entry into a mental hospital will be referred to as a "parental
commitment," to distinguish it from a voluntary commitment based on the patient's consent,
and an involuntary commitment which generally requires a judicial or administrative order.
Such parental commitments are sometimes sought by guardians of adult wards and raise
similar constitutional issues. See, e.g., Pima County Public Fiduciary v. Superior Ct., 26 Ariz.
Ct. App. 85, 546 P.2d 354 (1976).
6. Provided by GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2601 (1976).
7. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded as moot
431 U.S. 119 (1977), on remand sub. nom. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public
Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
8. Id. at 1042 n.4.
9. See Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2513 n.23 (1979).
10. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. at 139.
11. Id. Similar results were reached using different rationales in Halderman v. Pennhurst,
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opment in the doctrine of the "less restrictive alternative" which
previously had been interpreted to prohibit a state from confining
a person in a mental hospital only if a less restrictive alternative was
rather than possible only with a reallocation of
currently available,
2
public funds.'

The impact of J.L. v. Parham and Bartley v. Kremens was felt
almost immediately in the courts and legislatures of Virginia' 3 and
other jurisdictions, 4 and received extensive comment from scholars.' 5 The Supreme Court's recent reversal of those decisions in
Parham v. JR.' and Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles17 can be expected to have no less of an effect, partic446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), and Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
12. See generally Hoffman and Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A
Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1100 (1977). Hoffman and Foust
surveyed Virginia judges confronted with an involuntary commitment statute, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979), which, like that of most other states, prohibits commitment
to a hospital when a less restrictive form of treatment would suffice, but does not indicate
whether the court should considdr less restrictive alternatives which are appropriate, but
presently unavailable. Not surprisiqgly, a majority of the judges indicated that they would
order hospitalization where a less restrictive alternative was appropriate but unavailable,
even if they thought hospitalization would present a risk to the defendant. Id. at 1128.
13. Discussed infra at text accompanying note 29.
14. Poe v. Califano, Civ. Act 74-1800 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1978); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F.
Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Pima 'County Public Fiduciary v. Superior Court, 26 Ariz. Ct. App. 85, 546 P.2d 354 (1976); In re
Roger S., 19 Cal.3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977); In re Long, 25 N.C. App.
702, 214 S.E.2d 626 (1975).
15. A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES INP
mDIATICSADOLESCENT MEDICnE 256 (1977); J. WILSON,
THE RIGHTS OF MINORS INTHE MENTAL HEALTH SYsTEm 193 (1978); Ellis, Volunteering Children: ParentalCommitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 940 (1974);
Hoffman, The "Due Process"Rightsof Minors in Mental Hospitals, 13 U. OF S.F. L. REv. 63
(1978); Holladay, Due ProcessLimitations on ParentalRights to Commit Childrento Mental
Institutions, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 235 (1977); McCarry, Commitment of Minors to Mental
Institutions, 1978 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 653; Panneton, Children, Commitment and Consent: A ConstitutionalCrisis, 10 FAM. L.Q. 295 (1977); Teitelbaum and Ellis, The Liberty
Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L. Q. 153 (1978);
Note, "Voluntary"Admission of Children to Mental Hospitals:A Conflict of Interest Between
'Parent and Child, 36 MD. L. REV. 153 (1976); Note, Minors' Right to Due Process: Does it
Extend to Commitment to Mental Institutions?, 52 NOTRE DAM LAw. 136 (1976); Note, The
Mental Hospitalization of Children and the Limits of ParentalAuthority, 88 YALE L.J. 186
(1958); Comment, Parents, Children, and the InstitutionalizationProcess, A Constitutional
Analysis, 83 DICK L. REv. 261 (1979).
16. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
17. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979). Since most of the Supreme Court's reasoning is contained within
Parham v. J.R., this article will focus primarily on it.
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ularly on legislatures which may be tempted to dismantle reforms
wrought in response to the district court decisions. In Parham v.
J.R., all nine justices agreed that a state could at least initially
confine a child in a state hospital at a parent's request, assuming
the state employed adequate medical screening procedures.'8 The
majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger went further to say that a
state agency having custody of a child could also, at least initially,
"volunteer" a child into a state hospital without a prior hearing."
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, found no state action in,
and thus no application of the fourteenth amendment to, either
kind of commitment. 0 Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by
Justices Marshall and Stevens, agreed that a child could be confined in a hospital without a prior hearing, but argued that the
Court ought to have reached the question of the necessity of a hearing for continued confinement, which he would have answered by
requiring at least one post-admission hearing. 21 Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens also dissented from the majority in insisting
that, where a state agency rather than a parent was seeking admission of a child in its custody, a pre-admission hearing be provided.22
This article evaluates the current Virginia procedure for committing children to mental hospitals against the due process standards
delineated by the Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R.,2 3 and its companion case, Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles." It will be argued that those decisions ought to lead to
augmentation, rather than replacement, of existing p:rocedural safeguards with the systematic screening process endorsed by the Supreme Court.2
18. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2506.
19. Id. at 2512.
20. Id. at 2515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 2522.
23. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
24. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
25. The Court's paradigm of medical screening is cited in full infra at text accompanying
note 193.
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II.

A.

CURRENT VIRGINIA PROCEDURE

Informal Voluntary Admission

Virginia statute now provides: "Any hospital may admit as
a patient any person requesting admission who, having been examined by a physician on the staff of such hospital, is deemed to be in
2
need of hospitalization for mental illness or mental retardation.
Until it was revised in 1976,7 this statute also permitted the admission of "[a]ny person under eighteen years of age. . .on the
request of the parent or any person standing in loco parentisto such
infant." In the interim period between the General Assembly's
passage of House Bill 1256 which repealed this parental admission
provision and its effective date, July 1, 1976, parental admissions
were enjoined in Virginia by the consent order in Brown v.
2
Allerton. 1
The State of Georgia argued in Parhamv. JR. that without such
a provision for admission of minors at the request of parents, a child
could not have access to mental health services on a voluntary basis,
because they were legally incapable of consenting to treatment. 0
The consent order in Brown v. Allerton, however, permitted the
voluntary admission of children who were determined by the staff
to be capable of consenting, had received an explanation of the
nature of the admission and their right to object, and who in fact
31
had given a voluntary consent.
While this order was in effect only from April 19, 1976, until July
1, 1976, its guidelines for the informal voluntary admission of minors were adopted by the Virginia Department of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation almost verbatim as a departmental instruction governing practices in its facilities. Like the final order in
Brown v. Allerton, Departmental Instruction No. 60 is based on the
premise that "[t]he age of a minor does not control his ability to
give informed consent to his voluntary admission. '32 Unlike the
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
27. 1976 Va. Acts ch. 671, at 978.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65 (1972).
29. Civ. No. 75-0450-R (E.D. Va. April 19, 1976).
30. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 18, Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
31. Civ. No. 75-0450-R (E.D. Va. April 19, 1976).
32. Departmental Instruction No. 60 of the Virginia Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation at 1 (January 22, 1979).
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order, however, Departmental Instruction No. 60 requires facilities
to obtain the consent of the parent or guardian to admission of a
minor even where the minor has given informed consent. This additional requirement is at odds with the Department's position that
some minors on their own can give valid, informed consent to inpatient admission.33
Presumably, if a parent withholds consent to inpatient mental
health treatment sought by a minor who is willing and capable of
giving informed consent, and is in need of treatment, and the hospital adheres to current departmental policy, the minor would be
forced to seek from a juvenile and domestic relations district court
either a protective order based on a finding of neglect, 4 or a judicial
consent in lieu of parental consent.3
Minors in the custody of state agencies may also seek informal
voluntary admission under section 37.1-65, except to such facilities,
known as treatment centers, as the Virginia Treatment Center for
Children in Richmond. Admission to treatment centers is limited by
statute to children under the age of sixteen. Children in the custody
33. If age does not affect ability to consent, then the Department might with equal justification require the parental consent to the voluntary admission of adults. Departmental policy
on this point is unlikely to change in light of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (JCAH) Consolidated Standard 10.5.1, discussed briefly infra at note 102, which
presently requires for the voluntary admission of a child over 12 years of age both the patient's
and the parent's informed consent.
34. The court may order treatment without evidence of neglect under VA. CODE ANN. §
16.1-275 (Cum. Supp. 1979), discussed at note 90 infra and accompanying text. A preliminary, ex parte proceeding to obtain treatment services might be made under § 16.1-253 (A)(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1979). An order requiring both parents and, for example, a community mental
health clinic, to provide services for a child found to be nelected might be entered under §
16.1-279(1) and (2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). A "neglected child" is defined by statute in Virginia
to mean "any child whose parents or other person responsible for his care . . . [n]eglects or
refuses to provide care necessary for his health ....
" VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(A) (Cum.
Supp. 1979). Since under this definition it is possible that a child in a state hospital who does
not receive "care necessary for his health" might be neglected, neglect proceedings might be
initiated by anyone, including the child, usually by making a complaint t the local Department of Welfare office, to terminate mental health services as well as to obtain them.
35. Other than by those procedures referred to in note 34 supra, the court has authority to
give consent to treatment for a minor "separated from the custody of his parents" or where
the parent cannot be consulted with reasonable promptness. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1979). But § 16.1-241(D) (iv) (Cum. Supp. 1979) expands this authority, at least with
respect to emergency treatment, to empower the court to give consent as well where a parent
"fails to give such consent or provide such treatment when requested by the judge to do so."
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of state agencies must be admitted to treatment centers through the
commitment process, on either a formal voluntary or involuntary
basis."
The current Code of Virginia, which explicitly provides that, for
the purposes of obtaining outpatient mental health care, a minor is
deemed to be an adult, 7 and requires the same involuntary commitment procedure to be followed for both minors and adults,38 offers
no support for the present insistence in Departmental Instruction
No. 60 on parental consent to the informal voluntary admission of
minors. This requirement may be attributed to a traditional deference to the rights of parents who, regardless of the admission status
of the child, may be financially responsible for all or part of the cost
of care and treatment, at least for the first five years of institution39
alization.
If the admission is necessary to provide an appropriate education
for the child, then it must be provided without cost to the parent
or the child.40 This would also be true if an appropriate education
required admission to a private facility.4" While in cases of informal,
voluntary admissions of children, the issue of educational necessity
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-61 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.325.2(D)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979). For a discussion of this provision,
see, Comment, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 915 (1979).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 1976) (regarding state hospital services only). The
juvenile and domestic relations district court has even broader power under § 16.1-275 to
compel parents to pay for any treatment of the child: nonpayment may be punished as
contempt or nonsupport.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Both state and federal law define
"seriously emotionally disturbed" rather than "mentally ill" children as handicapped and
thus entitled to a free and appropriate education at public expense. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.3
(Cum. Supp. 1979); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1970).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-10.8(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Federal regulations require states
receiving federal assistance to pay for all costs of residentisl placement "including nonmedical care and room and board," as well as education, if the placement is necessitated for
whatever reason by the child's handicap, regardless of educational considerations. 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.33(c)(3) (1977). Appendix A to this regulation explains: "When residential care is necessitated not by the student's handicap but by factors such as the student's home conditions,
the recipient [the state receiving funds] is not required to pay the cost of room and board."
Nonetheless, some courts have read this regulation to impose liability on the state for all
costs of residential placement only when the placement is "for the purpose of providing...
a free and appropriate public education," rather than meeting other needs occasioned by the
child's handicap. See, e.g., Guempel v. State, 159 N.J. Super. 166, 387 A.2d 399, 408 (1978).
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primarily raises questions about financial responsibility for the cost
of care and treatment, in formal voluntary admissions and involuntary commitments, it raises more serious questions about the denial
of due process, since those procedures also ignore educational considerations."
B.

Formal Voluntary Admission

Formal voluntary admissions are not truly voluntary.43 They are
a consequence of someone other than the patient obtaining, after a
hearing before a judge," a consent order, under section 37.1-67.2,
42. The state board of education must "prescribe procedures to afford due process to
handicapped children and their parents or guardians and to school divisions in resolving
disputes as to program placement, individualized education program, tuition eligibility and
other matters as defined in state and federal law or regulations." VA. Con ANN. § 22-10.4(B)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). These state and federal statutes give
"any party aggrieved" by those proceedings a right to be hear, as was required in Mills v.
Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). Although
presently the state provides notice and hearing only to the parents, or in their absence, a
surroghte, and not the child, the statutes clearly intend procedural protection for the child
as well. Thus a commitment of a child to a state hospital, even on petition of the parent,
which ignores the child's loss of educational opportunity, denies the procedural protection
required by this statute to the child, and perhaps also to be board of education, which has
an affirmative duty to provide a free and appropriate education to the child, a duty which
cannot be waived by the parent.
Both J. L. (who died while the case was pending review by the Supreme Court) and J. R.,
the plaintiff class representatives, had been expelled from school prior to hospitalization
because they were "uncontrollable" or "disruptive and incorrigible." Parham v. J.R., 99 S.
Ct. 2493, 2497-98 (1979). Such expulsions today would probably violate the educational rights
of a mentally ill child, see Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978), and provide
a basis for seeking deinstitutionalization independent from those relied on in J.L. v. Parham.
43. See note 5 supra.
44. In cases involving adults, the judge may be either a regular or substitute general district
court judge, or he may be an attorney appointed by the senior circuit court judge to serve as
a "special justice," who may order temporary detention orders under § 37-1-67.1 (Repl. Vol.
1976), formal voluntary admission under § 37.1-67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979), or involuntary commitment under § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979). VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-10(11) (Cum. Supp.
1979). A special justice receives no fee for issuing or refusing to issue a temporary detention
order, but if he does issue one, he can expect to preside over at least a preliminary hearing,
for which he will receive $25.00, and, if in that preliminary hearing he finds the defendant
unwilling or unable to seek voluntary admission, he will preside over the involuntary commitment hearing, for which he will receive an additional $25.00. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-89 (Repl.
Vol. 1976). This raises questions about the impartiality of a special justice who issues a
temporary detention order, resulting in the defendant's seizure, or who denies a defendant
an opportunity to seek voluntary admission. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972). Where a defendant is a minor, orders under §§ 37.1-65.1, 37.1-67..., 37.1-67.2, or 37.167.3 must be issued by a juvenile and domestic relations district court judge. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-241(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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enforcing the agreement of the patient to a minimum period of
treatment for mental illness. This "voluntary" procedure is in sharp
contrast with that provided under section 37.1-65.1 for the
"voluntary" admission of mentally retarded persons who are found
incapable of consenting to treatment.
This latter procedure, known as "judicial certification of eligibility for admission," is worth examining here, since it contains procedural and substantive safeguards which are missing from the formal
45
voluntary admission procedure to mental health facilities.
Section 37.1-65.1 authorizes the court to empower a parent or
guardian or any "responsible person" to admit someone to a facility
for the mentally retarded for an indefinite period of time. This is not
an involuntary commitment only because the order does not compel
admission but simply authorizes the parents or someone else to sign
the mentally retarded person into the institution, if they so desire.
If they had not decided on institutionalization, they would not be
before the court in the first place, so the effect is the same as an
involuntary commitment.
To certify a mentally retarded person as eligible for admission the
court must provide that person with roughly the same procedural
rights as in the commitment of the mentally ill, including a right
to notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to present witnesses and
cross-examine adverse witnesses.4" There is a right to appeal certification within thirty days of the order in a trial de novo, before a jury,
if the defendant requests one. The appeal is heard in the circuit
court in the jurisdiction either where the certification was made, or
where the mental retardation facility to which the defendant was
4
admitted is located. 7
45. The judicial certification procedure in § 37.1-65.1 replaced, at least for mentally re-

tarded children, the parental commitment authorized by § 37.1-65 until its revision in 1976.
17he Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation has the authority, which it has yet to
exercise, to issue regulations permitting the judicial certification procedure to be avoided for
short term emergency or respite admission of the mentally retarded. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.165.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

46. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). But this statute in effect allows the
defense attorney to waive the defendant's right to be present at the hearing, and to waive

the right to cross-examine the court-appointed expert witness.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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The substantive requirements for certification are:
(i) that such person is not capable of requesting his own admission,
(ii) that the facility has approved the proposed admission .. ,
(iii) that there is no less restrictive alternative to institutional confinement, consistent with the best interests of the [defendant],
(iv) that [the defendant] is mentally retarded and in need of institutional training or treatment . ..s
The court appoints a physician or clinical psychologist to testify
as to (i) and (iv), and for (ii) depends on the state facility, whose
refusal to approve admission may be appealed administratively but
is not reviewed by the court hearing the issue of certification. While
the statute apparently places the burden of proving (iii) on the
petitioner, the court is not directed to appoint an expert on this
issue, or otherwise investigate alternatives to institutionalization.5
The court is not required to consider the educational needs of the
defendant, so it is entirely possible that the educational propriety
of institutionalizing a child will be considered, if ever, only when the
state seeks reimbursement from the parents."
By contrast, the formal voluntary admission of the mentally ill
child under section 37.1-67.2 is for a finite period of time and requires a judicial determination that the child, in addition to being
willing to seek voluntary admission on the terms offered by the
court,"1 is capable of giving consent to such admission. While Departmental Instruction No. 6052 certainly permits state facilities to
accept formal voluntary admissions of minors under section 37.167.2, it is conceivable that some Virginia courts, without statutory
or precedential guidance, might find minors incapable of seeking
voluntary admission solely because of age. This is pe:rhaps less likely
to occur now that juvenile and domestic relations district courts
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65.1(C)(3) (Cune. Supp. 1979).
49. The defendant may at his on ' expense call expert witnesses on this point. VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.1-65.1(C)(2) (Cur. Supp. 1979).
50. See note 42 supra.
51. The only terms explicitly authorized by statute are hospitalization for a period not to
exceed two days and seventy-two hour notice to the hospital by the patient of intention to
leave. It is conceivable, however, that a defendant who agreed to accept those conditions, but
who otherwise seemed uncooperative, might nonetheless be found "unwilling."
52. See notes 32 & 33 supra and accompanying text.
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have been given exclusive original jurisdiction of both the certification of mentally retarded minors and commitment, including formal
voluntary admission, of mentally ill minors. 53
The formal voluntary admission of a mentally ill minor begins
with the temporary detention order, authorized by section 37.1-67.1.
This is issued by a juvenile and domestic relations district court
judge rather than by a magistrate. The judge must have probable
cause to believe that the child is "mentally ill and in need of hospitalization."54 He may base this finding either upon a sworn petition
or upon his own motion.5
This order permits detention for forty-eight hours, or if that period terminates on a weekend or holiday, seventy-two hours. It also
authorizes the institution holding the defendant to render whatever
emergency medical and psychiatric services it determines are in the
best interests of the defendant.
Section 37.1-67.1 permits the judge to release the defendant prior
to the expiration of the order if the judge finds "from all evidence
readily available that such release will not pose an imminent danger
to [the defendant] or others" and the defendant agrees to appear.
But whether the defendant is detained or released prior to the
hearing, the current statutory language requires both the preliminary hearing described in section 37.1-67.2 and, if necessary, the
involuntary commitment hearing under section 37.1-67.3, to be held
within the forty-eight or seventy-two hour period, beginning with
the execution of the temporary detention order. Furthermore, although section 37.1-67.3 gives the defendant the right to "an opportunity to prepare any defenses he may have," it does not specifically
give him a right to a continuance or authorize hearings beyond the
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.1 (Repl. Vol. 1976). "Mentally ill" is defined as "any person
afflicted with mental disease to such an extent that for his own welfare or the welfare of
others, he requires care and treatment .

. . ."

§ 37.1-1(15). The subject of a temporary

detention order must not only need care and treatment, but a particular kind of care and
treatment, hospitalization.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.1 (Repl. Vol. 1976). Some Virginia judges have refused to issue
temporary detention orders on their own motions, because they believe this disqualifies them
from, in effect, hearing that motion in a hearing under § 37.1-67.3.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.4 (Repl. Vol. 1976).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:695

forty-eight or seventy-two hour period beginning with the execution
of the temporary detention order.
It is in the preliminary hearing that formal voluntary admission
may occur, if the defendant is willing and capable of consenting to
voluntary admission on the terms offered by the judge. The judge
need not appoint an examining physician until the involuntary commitment hearing. There is no statutory requirement that counsel be
appointed for unrepresented defendants in the preliminary hearing,
although at least prior to Parhamv. J.R.,57 it was assumed that the
Constitution required appointed counsel, since the preliminary
hearing was a critical stage in the proceedings. 8 If the judge does
appoint counsel for an unrepresented defendant, section 37.1-89
contemplates paying the attorney twenty-five dollars for the preliminary hearing as well as twenty-five dollars for the voluntary commitment hearing.
It is therefore possible under section 37.1-67.2 that the formal
voluntary admission of a minor might occur without, the benefit of
counsel or a court-appointed physician. Furthermore, no showing is
necessary that the state hospital has accepted the child, that there
are no less restrictive alternatives to the state hospital, or that his
educational rights are not in jeopardy. The possibility that the state
hospital will turn away the defendant after an order of formal voluntary admission under section 37.1-67.2 may incline the court to
proceed to an involuntary commitment. If the defendant wishes to
contest the allegations of mental illness, dangerousness or inability
to care for himself, or if he desires non-hospital treatment, he must
decline formal voluntary admission and take his chances in the
involuntary commitment hearing under section 37.1-67.3.
The formal voluntary admission under section 37.1-67.2, requires
the defendant both to accept a "minimum period of treatment. . . not to exceed seventy-two hours," and thereafter to "give the
hospital at least forty-eight hours notice prior to leaving the hospital," unless the hospital itself discharges him earlier.
57. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
58. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (civil commitment of nineyear-old to state facility for mentally retarded required defense counsel at every step of the
proceedings).
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It is not at all clear what recourse the court or the hospital has if
the defendant disregards the conditions of his admission. The only
certain authority the hospital staff has is to seek a tempoary detention order under section 37.1-67.1, beginning the commitment process anew. This is also the staff's sole remedy if it wants to detain
the defendant beyond the minimum period ordered and after proper
notice by the defendant.
Whether the child enters the hospital through an informal voluntary admission under section 37.1-65, or through a formal voluntary
admission under section 37.1-67.2, he has the unconditional right to
refuse psychotropic medication. If the staff wants to provide such
treatment over the child's protests, it must obtain a temporary detention order and seek involuntary commitment. 9
C.

Involuntayy Commitment

If the judge finds the defendant lacks either the capacity or willingness to seek formal voluntary admission, he proceeds, usually
without delay, to an involuntary commitment hearing authorized
by 37.1-67.3, at which stage he must appoint a physician"0 and, if
the defendant is unrepresented, a defense attorney. Often the preliminary hearing under section 37.1-67.2 and the involuntary commitment hearing under section 37.1-67.3 are consolidated into one
hearing.2 The procedural requirements for the involuntary commitment hearing are the same as those of the certification hearing. 3
Substantively, section 37.1-67.3 requires the judge, after observing the defendant, obtaining a "positive certification" 4 from the
court-appointed physician, and considering all other relevant
59. This is one indication of the way in which the patient's liberty is impaired by involuntary commitment.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979) requires only that the court appoint a
physician "who is licensed in Virginia and who is skilled in the diagnosis of mental illness."
It does not require that the physician be a board-certified psychiatrist, or even a physician
who holds himself out to the public as a psychiatrist.
61. Appointment of both the physician and the defense attorney is left entirely to the
discretion of the judge who may appoint the same individuals in case after case.
62. Practice varies from judge to judge as to whether a payment voucher is submitted to
the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation for a $25.00 or $50.00 fee each for
both the defense attorney and the special justice for such a "combined" hearing.
63. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
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evidence in a full adversarial hearing, to specifically find that the
defendant:
a) presents an imminent danger to himself or others as a result of
mental illness, 5 or
b) has otherwise been proven to be so seriously mentally ill as to be
substantially unable to care for himself,66 and
c) that there is no less restrictive alternative to institutional confinement and treatment and that alternatives
to institutional hospi7
talization were deemed not suitable.6

The court is required to find by clear and convincing evidence 6
either a) and c), or b) and c), in order to justify a commitment to
the state hospital. If the court finds a) or b), but does not find c),
that is, if the absence of a less restrictive alternative is not proved,
the court's authority is limited to ordering "out-patient treatment,
day treatment in a hospital, referral to a community mental health
clinic, or other such appropriate treatment modalities as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the individual."6
There is no provision in section 37.1-67.3 that permits the court
to retain jurisdiction over a defendant who is ordered, but does not
seek, out-patient treatment, so that short of judicially-innovated
remedies, 0 the adult defendant can only be brought before the court
again on a new temporary detention order issued under section 37.167.1. Similarly, the court is given no authority in section 37.1-67.3
65. The distinctly different problems of defining and predicting danger to self or others

have generated a large volume of literature. See, e.g., DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN
LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH (C. Frederick ed. 1978); S. PFOHL, PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS
(1978).
66. This vague catch-all criterion is based entirely on the state's pareaspatriaepower, and
is distinguished from that of dangerousness to self, by exclusion of the suicidal. The only real
limitation on commitments based on this criterion is the requirement that there be no less
restrictive alternative.
67. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
68. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979). What difference this standard of proof makes
with a statute which permits great judicial freedom in interpreting such words as "imminent
danger," "substantially unable," and "not suitable" is questionable, as the Supreme Court
recognized.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
70. Such as a commitment hearing that is adjourned or continued for a period of treatment,
or a commitment to the state hospital with the provision that the defendant be furloughed
to a community program.
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to modify its order committing the defendant to a state hospital
when an alternative to hospitalization later becomes available because of a reduced waiting list at a community mental health clinic,
the control of the defendant's symptoms by psychotropic medication, or the like. Where the defendant is a minor, however, the court
may retain jurisdiction over the defendant under section 16.1-242, '
and make modifications in the commitment order as circumstances
change.
The court-appointed physician is required by section 37.1-67.3 to
examine the defendant and certify that he has probable cause to
believe that "he is or is not mentally ill.

. .

does or does not present

an imminent danger to himself or others, and requires or does not
require involuntary hospitalization." A "positive certification" by
the court-appointed physician is made a necessary condition of a
commitment order by section 37.1-67.3. Just what is meant by a
"positive certification" is not apparent from the Code, but presumably it includes a probable cause determination of mental illness and
a need for voluntary hospitalization, but not necessarily dangerous72

ness.

73
As in the certification procedure for mentally retarded persons,
current statutory language does not allocate responsibility for investigating less restrictive alternatives. The burden is clearly not on the
7
defendant to establish that there is a less restrictive alternative,
although his counsel just as clearly has an ethical duty to explore

those alternatives.75 The Code also fails to require the court to assess
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-242 (Cum.Supp. 1979).
72. If a positive certification of "dangerousness" were required, the court could not commit
a person on the grounds that he was unable to care for himself because of mental illness. It
is also possible to read the statute to require only that the physician's certification makes
probable cause findings one way or the other on the issues of mental illness, dangerousness,
or need for hospitalization, although if the physician were in this sense "positive" that, for
example, the defendant was not mentally ill, there would be no expert evidence to support
an order of involuntary commitment.
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65.1 (Cum.Supp. 1979), discussed at notes 45 & 46 supra and
accompanying text.
74. See, Hoffman and Foust, supra n.12, at 1109.
75. In at least one state such an investigation is required by statute. See ARwz. Rav. STAT.
Supp. 1979) nor the VA. CODE
ANN. § 36-537 (1974). Neither VA. CODE ANN.§ 37.1-67.3 (Cum.
OF PROFEssioNAL RESPONSMILMY H:EC:7-12 gives the defense attorney much guidance as to

when in a commitment hearing the attorney may begin to act as a guardian ad litem and
advocate what the attorney thinks is best for the client, rather than what the client thinks is
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the adverse educational impact of institutionalization on the child,
but defense counsel might nonetheless raise the issue."6
While section 37.1-67.3 permits the court to order treatment in,
for example, a community mental health clinic, it does not require
the court to consult with that clinic prior to deciding whether treatment is or is not available and appropriate. Even where the defendant is a child, and the juvenile and domestic relations district court
can order a clinic operated by a community mental health and
mental retardation services board" to provide services to the defendant (in addition to ordering the defendant to seek them), the clinic
is entitled to prior notice and hearing."
No time limitation is placed on an order directing out-patient
therapy, or some other treatment modality less restrictive than institutional confinement. The order of commitment -to a hospital, in
contrast, may not authorize confinement for longer than 180 days,
after which the defendant must be served with a new temporary
detention order or released. 9 The commitment order, it is important
best. However, either as attorney or guardian ad litem, an investigation of less restrictive
alternatives is mandatory. See generally Slobogin, The Role of the Attorney in Civil Commitment, U. RICH. MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL STUDiEs NEWSLETTER (March 1979).
76. See note 42 supra.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-194 (Cum. Supp. 1979) permits the state b) make the matching
grants to cities and counties to establish and operate local mental health and mental retardation programs. These programs are directed by boards of from five to fifteen members appointed by local government. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-195 (Cum. Supp. 1979). (The boards
authorized by Chapter 10 of Title 37.1 are commonly referred to as "Chapter 10 Boards.")
These programs follow the model of the "community mental health center" set forth in § 201
of the Community Mental Health Center Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2689 (1976 & Supp. 1979)
(amended 1978), and while the entire state is served by Chapter 10 programs, not all of them
receive federal funds. While both state and federal programs require senices to courts, absent
a specific agreement between the court and the Chapter 10 Board, a court-ordered evaluation
or treatment could be refused, or at least denied preference over other prospective clients on
a waiting list.
78. To the extent that a specific contract with the court, Chapter 10 policy, or the fee
schedule, requires a program to provide court-ordered evaluation or treatment, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-278 (Cum. Supp. 1979) still entitles the program to notice and opportunity to be heard
before a juvenile and domestic relations district court issues an order compelling the provision
of such evaluation or services.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Recommitment will usually occur in a
hearing held on the hospital grounds, often a great distance from the defendant's home. The
physician appointed by the judge is usually on the staff of the hospital. Under such circumstances, it is even less likely that community alternatives to institutional confinement will
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to note, only fixes a maximum period of confinement, and does not
usually limit the hospital director's discretion to release the defendant earlier." After the commitment order is entered, the defendant
is taken to the state hospital. Prior to formal admission and within
twenty-four hours, he must be screened by a physician to determine
whether there is "sufficient cause to believe . . .[he] is mentally
ill," the only condition of admission after an involuntary commitment."1
Once an involuntarily committed patient is admitted, however,
the hospital director may unconditionally release him if he determines that the patient is "recovered," "not mentally ill," or that his
"discharge . . . will not be detrimental to the public welfare, or
injurious to the patient."" The director also has broad authority to
grant convalescent leave to a patient who does not meet the statutory criteria for unconditional discharge."
Although the State Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation is authorized "to develop and institute pre-admission screening
to prevent inappropriate admissions to the facilities and programs
under its control,"" it has not yet done so. Such regulations might
require, as a condition of admission after a commitment order, that
the parent obtain the approval of the state hospital or the local
school board prior to obtaining a temporary detention order. Or
these regulations might require the judge to order commitments
initially to a local mental health center, and permit state hospital
admission only by referral. Neither sort of regulation would be entirely consistent with existing statutory language, 5 so that it is diffireceive proper consideration, since neither the judge, physician, nor appointed counsel will
have contacts with the defendant's community.
80. Of course the director lacks such discretion to release patients, usually confined to
forensic units, who are being held for a mental status evaluation prior to criminal trial
pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169 (Repl. Vol. 1975), after an acquittal by reason of
insanity pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181 (Cum. Supp. 1979), or transfer after civil commitment from the correctional system, or who are subject to virtually any judicial order other
than one under VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-98 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-98(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979); § 37.1-126 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
85. Such mandatory screening regulations would limit the power of judges and deny access to judges by petitioners contrary to the provisions of VA. CODE ANN. § § 37.1-67.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1976), 37.1-67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979), and 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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cult to see how effective mandatory pre-admission screening could
be implemented without statutory amendment.86
The juvenile and domestic relations district court in Virginia,
with its exclusive original jurisdiction over the commitment of mentally ill children and certification of mentally retarded children,
must adhere to the same procedures established for the commitment and certification of adults in Title 37.1,11 even after the court
has adjudicated a child "delinquent" or "in need of services.",, In
apparent contradiction to this restriction on the court, section 16.1275 gives the court almost unlimited discretion to order that a child
be subjected to mental health examination and treatment by a local
mental health center,8 or if that is not available, by any physician,
or clinical psychologist (the latter being permitted to only examine
the child). Solely on the basis of a physician's written recommendation, the court may summarily send a child to a state mental hospital for up to thirty days "for the purpose of obtaining a recommendation for the treatment of the child.""0 While the primary purpose
of this thirty day commitment is evaluation, physician-directed
treatment would also seem to be permitted. Unlike an involuntary
commitment, the hospital probably may not release the child prior
to the expiration of the thirty days or whatever lesser period the
court has ordered without prior court approval.'
An order of involuntary commitment may be appealed to a circuit
court within thirty days.2 Additionally state habeas corpus relief
may be sought at any time by an involuntarily committed patient
who cannot informally persuade the director to release him prior to
the expiration of the commitment order. 3
86. Such an amendment is proposed infra at notes 222-230 and accompanying text.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

88.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 16.1-280 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

89. By "local mental health center," this statute apparently means a Chapter 10 mental
health program, which is intended to be consulted first by the court. See note 77 supra.
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-275 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
91. If the court intended to make the state hospital's cooperation mandatory, however, VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-278 (Cum. Supp. 1979) would require prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-103 (Repl. Vol. 1976).

1979]
D.

POST-Parham

713

REMEDIES

Rights of Children in State Hospitals

Admission to a state hospital, whether on an informal or formal
voluntary basis, or on an order of involuntary commitment, does
not, in Virginia, raise a presumption of legal incapacity or incompetency. 4 In theory, then, the patient should retain all of his legal
rights unless he is subsequently adjudicated incompetent,95 except
that patients admitted on an involuntary commitment order may
be arrested if they "escape."" In reality, however, a patient gains
some rights and loses others after admission. Particularly where the
patient is a child, the exercise of those rights may also be impaired
or enhanced by the staff, depending on their widely varying perceptions of those rights.1
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-87 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-128.02 (Repl. Vol. 1976) sets forth the procedure for determining
"legal incompetency." Sections 37.1-128.1 and 37.1-132 (Repl. Vol. 1976) establish alternative
procedures to create partial guardianships for persons "incapacitated" by mental disability
or impaired health, respectively.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-76 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
97. In February, 1979, the author surveyed 452 Chapter 10 Board-employed mental health
professionals. Their responses to a question regarding the rights of children suggest their
deference to those rights during treatment of children: Under present Virginia law, a mentally
ill juvenile
No. of responses

'A of responses

(1) has the same rights as any
other juvenile

86

20.6

(2) has the same rights as a
mentally ill adult

37

8.9

(3) has the same rights as any
adult

2.4

(4) must legally obey the wishes
of his or her parents or anyone
standing in the place of a parent

29

7.0

(5) may be involuntarily
committed by a judge, if the
parents do not object to the
hospitalization

28

6.7

136

32.6

91

21.8

(6) Both (4) and (5) are true.
(7) (1), (2), and (3) are true.
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In Wyatt v. Stickney, 5 patients involuntarily committed to Alabama's Bryce Hospital, once in the hospital, were determined to
have certain specific rights protected by the United States Constitution.9 Many states, such as Virginia, subsequently enacted statutory "bills of rights" for patients in state mental hospitals and residents in state mental retardation facilities which closely tracked
Judge Johnson's findings in Wyatt v. Stickney. Thus, it has been
often unnecessary, for example, for a court to determine whether
there is a constitutional right, once admitted to a hospital, to treatment in the least restrictive setting, since there is a clear statutory
right to treatment. 0 0
While the Wyatt opinion concerned itself with involuntarily confined patients in state hospitals,10 1 the Virginia statutory "bill of
rights" applies to patients or residents regardless of their status in
any facilities "operated, funded, or licensed by the Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation," and does not on its face
make any distinction between patients because of minority.0 2
A child in a state hospital would therefore be entitled on the same
basis as an adult to "[b]e treated under the least restrictive conditions consistent with his condition and not be subjected to unnecessary physical restraint and isolation."'0 3 As in the involuntary com98. 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See also 334 F. Supp. 13.d (M.D. Ala. 1971),
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub
nor. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
99. 344 F. Supp. at 379-86 ("minimum constitutional standards for adequate treatment of
the mentally ill"); 344 F. Supp. at 395-407 ("minimum constitutional standards for adequate
habilitation of the mentally retarded").
100. See, e.g., Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
101. The class of plaintiffs was originally comprised of all persons involuntarily confined
for mental treatment in Alabama's Bryce Hospital. The class was later enlarged to include
involuntary patients at Searcy Hospital and at Partlow State School and Hospital for the
mentally retarded, both in Alabama. 344 F. Supp. at 374. Voluntarily admitted patients
might also be in a position to complain about a denial of equal protection if similar benefits
were not extended to them.
102. By contrast, some states, such as North Carolina, specifically enumerate by statute
the rights of minors in state hospitals. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.14 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
To be accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospita-s (JCAH), and thus
eligible for Medicaid reimbursement for services to children, the facility must accord children
over the age of 12 an elaborate array of "patient rights," although generally the parents or
guardians of all children and adolescents must also give informed consent to most aspects of
treatment. JCAH CONSOLIDATED STANDARDS FOR CHILD, ADOLESCENT, AND ADULT PSYCHIATRIC,
ALCOHOLISM, AND DRUG ABUSE PROGRAMS 31 (April 1979).
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mitment procedure itself, there is a question here whether the right
compels the state to create less restrictive conditions where none
exist, or permits the state to resort to the least restrictive setting
currently available.' °4
Similarly, the patient, adult or child, is guaranteed "prompt evaluation and treatment or training about which he is informed insofar
as he is capable of understanding." These so-called rights to treatment are gained once a person becomes a patient, but by their very
wording suggest the loss of another right, the right to be subjected
to treatment only after informed consent.' 5 It is on this point that
the existing statutes,' 0 regulations implementing the statutory "bill
of rights,"'0 ° and departmental instructions,' 8 make a clumsy attempt to distinguish between the consent required from adults and
minor patients, and between the consent required for psychiatric
and non-psychiatric treatment.
The Virginia statutory "bill of rights" of patients and residents,
despite its assurance that ,all state and federal legal rights are retained after admission,'0 ' only gives patients a limited right to be
informed about treatment,' 0 only requires informed consent to experimental or investigational research, and permits even this consent to be given by a surrogate."' A patient subject to "hazardous
treatment or irreversible surgical procedures" may have "upon request, [a prior] impartial review," which may be dispensed with
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-84.1(6) (Repl. Vol. 1976).

104. See note 12 supra.
105. Violations of this right are redressed in Virginia by actions in negligence requiring
expert testimony as to the nature of the consent that would be obtained by a reasonable
practitioner. Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 650-51, 222 S.E.2d 783, 788 (1976). Such action at
the election of either party must be pfeceded by screening by a medical malpratice review
panel. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See generally Stone, Informed Consent:
Special Problems for Psychiatry, 30 Hosp. & Comm. PSycmATRY 321 (1979).
106. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-84.1 (Repl. Vol. 1976) and 54-325.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
107. Rules and Regulations to Assure the Rights of Patients and Residents of Hospitals and
Other Facilities Operated By the [Virginia] Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation (April 15, 1978) (hereinafter "Patient's Rights Regulations").
108. Departmental Instruction No. 60 [admission of minor] and No. 55 [refusal of treatment] of the Virginia Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (January 22,
1979 and August 8, 1978, respectively).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-84.1(1) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-84.1(2) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-84.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
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"in case of emergency procedures required for preservation of his
health."' Obviously these are not really rights of patients in state
facilities, but dimunitions of rights that would ordinarily be enjoyed
by patients admitted to a general hospital for, say, an appendec113
tomy.
The regulations which implement the statutory "bill of rights" in
state facilities further diminish the child's control over treatment by
permitting the consent of the child's "legally authoriZed representative" ' 4 to those few forms of treatment requiring consent. This is
consistent with other Virginia statutes addressing the general issue
of consent to the treatment of minors,11 5 but is in conflict with Departmental Instruction No. 60 which requires the informed consent
of both the voluntarily admitted child and his parent, or guardian,
prior to psychotropic medication. In the case of an involuntarily
committed child, just the consent of the parent or guardian is re11 6
quired.

The regulations specifically deny the right to refuse treatment to
patients civilly committed,' or committed after an acquittal in a
criminal trial by reason of insanity. ' But, again, departmental policy is to permit the involuntarily committed adult and child to
refuse treatment on religious grounds and, in other cases, to insist
on a second opinion before medication.1 Since this policy is not
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-84.1(5) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
113. In Parham v. J.R., the majority continually analogized admis3ion of a child to a
mental hospital to admission for procedures such as appendectomy. See, e.g., 99 S. Ct. at
2504-05, or 99 S. Ct. at 2515 (Stewart, J., concurring). The authors they cite in support of
this analogy are careful to distinguish the legal effects of hospitalization of a child for physical
treatment from that for psychiatric treatment. See, e.g., Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical
CareDecision.makingAuthority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. Rav. 285, 286 n.2
(1976).
114. Patient's Rights Regulations, supra note 107, at 2.
115. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-84.1 (Repl. Vol. 1976) and 54-325.2 (Cure. Supp. 1979).
116. Departmental Instruction No. 60, supra note 108, at 4.
117. Patient's Rights Regulations, supra note 107, at 3. See in particular, Gaughan and
LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patientto Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 LAw
& PSYCHOLOGY Rav. 43 (1978). See also Gonzdles, For Mental Patients, The Cure May Be
Worse, 242 J.A.M.A. 226 (1979), for a brief, recent survey of medical opinion on the adverse
side-effects of antipsychotic drugs.
118. See note 80 supra.
119. Departmental Instruction No. 60, supra note 108, at 4; Departmental Instruction No.
55, supra note 108, at 3.
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formalized in a statute or regulation, and since this limited "right
to refuse treatment" depends on the patient's assertion of it, rather
than a requirement that the hospital obtain informed consent, it is
of dubious value to liberty interests of the patient.
The regulations for implementing the statutory "bill of rights" in
Virginia also provide a three-tiered system of administrative relief,
for adult and child alike, through a patient advocate, local human
rights committee and state human rights committee.2 There is no
requirement that this process be exhausted before seeking injunctive relief, or damages on a statutory tort theory, in a state court
for an abridgment of these rights provided by statute.
III. Parham v. J.R.
A.

The State Action in ParentalCommitments

In taking the case of Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court asked
the parties in particular to argue the threshold issue of whether,
when a parent in Georgia signed his child into a state hospital, there
was sufficient state action to subject that admission to constitutional restraints.2 ' If the state was not "significantly involved" in
these parental commitments, the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment would not apply.'22 The state of Georgia
claimed that they were only providing services to parents, who in
turn were acting on' behalf of their children; the child was a
"voluntary patient." The attorneys for the plaintiff class of children pointed out that even though the parents initiated the commitment process, the state hospital decided whom to admit. It was
difficult for Georgia to deny this involvement since elsewhere it
argued that it was providing due process by assuring that a physician at the state hospital made "the ultimate determination that a
child is to be admitted" after a multi-disciplinary screening proce120. Patient's Rights Regulations, supra note 107, at 18. For a careful analysis of this

review process by one of its creators, the late Dr. Browning Hoffman, see Hoffman and Dunn,
Beyond Rouse and Wyatt: An Administrative-LawModel for Expanding and Implementing
the Mental Patient'sRight to Treatment, 61 VA. L. Rav. 297 (1975).
121. Parham v. J.L., 431 U.S. 936 (1977).
122. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 370 (1967). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1974).
123. Brief for Appellants at 26, Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
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dure.1 24 Moreover, there was even greater state involvement where

the state itself requested the admission of a child who had become,
as J.R. had, a ward of the state through a neglect proceeding. Finally, it could hardly be denied that regardless of what route the
child had
taken to the hospital, it was the state who detained him
5
12

there.

Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, devoted less than
a sentence to the issue of state action: "It is not disputed that a
child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in
not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment and that the
State's involvement in the commitment decision
constitutes state
'1 26
action under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Stewart, however, adopted the position of the State of
Georgia, that "it has been a canon of the common law that parents
speak for their minor children.

' 127

As long as the state recognizes a

reasonable definition of minority, it may thereby constitutionally
authorize parents to make medical decisions on behalf of their children. There is no consitutional difference between an adult voluntarily admitting himself to a state mental hospital and a parent
"volunteering" on behalf of his child. There is no consitutional difference between a parent confining his child in a state hospital for
an appendectomy and confining his child for mental health services,
although, Justice Stewart admitted, the latter "results in a far
1 28
greater loss of liberty.

124. Id. at 33.
125. The same might also be said for a child in a private hospital, although the Court did
not reach that question in Parham v. J.R. or Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979). For a recent decision that did find state action in a private
hospital commitment by a private physician, see Kay v. Benson, Civ. No. 77-86 (D. N.H.,
July 6, 1979) where the court found that since commitment was a power normally exercised
by government, a physician who signed a certificate leading to the detention of the plaintiff
was clothed with state authority for the purposes of a § 1983 action. See also, Ruffler v. Phelps
Memorial Hospital, 453 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) holding that the civil commitment
and treatment of the mentally ill was a public function even when performed by a private
hospital; thus there was sufficient state action to subject a private hospital to a civil rights
action. But see Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hospital, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 27 (D. Minn. 1963);
Spampinato v. M. Breger & Co., 270 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 944 (1960).
126. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2503. See also Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809
(1979); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967; Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
127. 99 S. Ct. at 2513 (Stewart, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 2515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Justice Stewart attempted to distinguish PlannedParenthoodof
Missouri v. Danforth'9 which divested parents of absolute medical
decision-making authority where the minor sought an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. He reasoned that the right to
an abortion is a substantive constitutional right,'30 but that the
children in Parham "had no substantive consitutional right not to
be hospitalized for psychiatric treatment."' 3 ' This statement is difficult to reconcile with Justice Stewart's own often-cited finding in
O'Connorv. Donaldson'32 that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-dangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends.""'
But in Danforth, although the parent's decision-making authority
was enforced by criminal sanction against doctors who performed
abortions without parental consent,'34 the Court had nonetheless
viewed the parent's authority itself as an attempted delegation by
the state of an authority which it lacked.' 5 Thus, the critical and
impermissible state action in Danforthwas the parent's exercise of
state authority over the child's decision whether to seek an abortion.
Similar state authority is also exercised by parents in committing
the child.
Even if the parent within the meaning of Danforth depended on
a delegation of state authority to admit his child to a state hospital,
Justice Stewart would continue to deny that sufficient state action
existed. In his concurring opinion, he went so far as to assert that
when a guardian (such as a state agency of which J.R. was a ward)
admitted a child to a state hospital he too should be presumed to
be acting in the best interests of the person legally incapable of
acting for himself, thus rendering the commitment voluntary.' 3' Justice Brennan, characterizing this unprecedented approach to the
129. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
130. Stewart probably perceived this right to be founded upon notions of substantive due
process under the fourteenth amendment.
131. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2515, n.6 (Stewart, J., concurring).
132. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
133. Id. at 576.
134. 428 U.S. at 57.
135. Id. at 75.
136. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2514 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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concept of state action as "particularly unpersuasive," remarked
that "[w]ith equal logic it could be argued that criminal trials are
unnecessary since prosecutors are not supposed to prosecute inno1 37
cent persons.
Justice Stewart seemed to consider the parent's authority in
committing the child, if not wholly state-created, then at least
constitutionally subject to state restrictions, such as a preadmission hearing for children whose parents seek to commit
them.13 He denied children protected rights in avoiding institutionalization. He also denied to their parents a protected autonomy in
the care and control of their children to the extent that that requires
institutionalization. Justice Stewart's opinion, therefore, depends
not upon any constitutional distinctions between the adult and the
child, but upon a conviction that a state may create such distinctions as it pleases, without invoking the protection, for adult or
139
child, of the fourteenth amendment.
All members of the Court, with the notable exception of Justice
Stewart, had no trouble finding state action in parental commitment. However it is unfortunate that they failed to articulate the
basis for doing so, since it would have clarified the balance that the
decision struck between the state, the parent, and the child if the
Court had established whether the state derived its power from the
parent, or the parent from the state. If the Court was inclined to the
latter position, it would seem to entitle the child to due process
protection even where the commitment was to a private hospital, a
question the Court had no occasion to address in.
Parham4 ' or
InstitutionalizedJuveniles."'
137. Id. at 2522 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissnting in part).
138. Id. at 2515 (Stewart, J., concurring): "This is not to say that in this area the Constitution compels a State to respect the traditional authority of a parent, aE in the Meyer and
Pierce cases. I believe as in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.
645, that the Constitution would tolerate intervention by the State."
139. But see id. at 2515, n.8, which cites Princeto suggest that if the state impairs parental
authority by requiring pre-admission hearings for children, this hearing "would, of course,
be subject to the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
140. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
141. 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
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B. ParentalDue Process: ProtectingParent, Child, and State in
a Single Proceeding
After determining that a child committed by his parent or guardian has a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,' the question remained: "what process is
due?".' Conceding that the child possessed a protected liberty interest of some kind, Chief Justice Burger cited his earlier opinion
for the unanimous Court in Addington v. Texas, '" as well as In re
Gault'" and Specht v. Patterson.'"Nonetheless, these cases proved
to be unreliable guides as to the kinds of procedural safeguards the
Court would extend to the children in parental commitments.
In Addington v. Texas, Chief Justice Burger had implemented a
belief expressed four years earlier in O'Connor v. Donaldson:
There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish
without due process of law. [Citation omitted.] Commitment must
be justified on the basis of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons
for committing a particular individual must be established in an
appropriate proceeding.'47
When Frank Addington's mother had asked the court to commit
him to a mental hospital indefinitely, in addition to a full adversarial hearing before a jury with court-appointed counsel, the Chief
Justice held that the grounds for commitment must be proved by
"clear and convincing evidence."
The Court in In re Winship,'45 had disregarded "civil labels and
good intentions" to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Surprisingly, however, in Addington
v. Texas both the noncriminal nature of the commitment process
142. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
143. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972) ("due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands").
144. 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
145. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

146. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
147. 422 U.S. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
148. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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and the nonpunitive purposes of commitment were used to justify
a somewhat lower standard."' The Court was also influenced by the
possibility that freedom was not much better than commitment for
someone who was "genuinely mentally ill."5" Presumably, freedom
was always much better for the defendant than confinement after a
criminal conviction or an adjudication of delinquency. Chief Justice Burger even doubted that an unconfined mentally ill person in
need of treatment was "wholly at liberty"1 51 despite his remarks to
52
the contrary in O'Connor v. Donaldson.
The unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis 53 did not lead the Court
to impose greater procedural safeguards in order to reduce the risk
of error in commitment decisions. Instead, the Court was persuaded
by the "subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis" to lower the
standard of proof from that used in criminal proceedings to facilitate commitments. 5 ' This deference to medical expertise and the
medical model of mental illness, unrelated to precedent, is perhaps
the most satisfactory explanation for the varying approaches taken
by the Court to civil commitment and juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Yet the standard of proof required in Addington v. Texas is higher
than that of a mere preponderance of the evidence used in most civil
proceedings, and is accompanied by the full panoply of procedural
due process safeguards provided in criminal proceedings. In
Parham, where a child was the subject of the commitment, Chief
Justice Burger viewed all of these safeguards as "time-consuming
procedural minuets."1 55 How did the Court, beginning from the
same assumption, that commitment could not be accomplished
without due process, arrive at such different conclusions as to what
process was due?
149. See note 68 supra.
150. Id. at 1811.
151. Id.
152. 422 U.S. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
153. Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis in
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) and cited Ennis
and Litwack, Psychiatryand the Presumption of Expertise:Flipping Coins in the Courtroom,
62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 697-719 (1974), and Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968).
154. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. at 1811.
155. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2506.
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In both Addington v. Texas'56 and Parham v. J.R.157 the Court
turned to a deceptively simple test developed in Mathews v.
Eldridge to determine the procedural requirements of due process.
The Court considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."'
In Addington v. Texas, although the commitment of Addington,
an adult, was sought by his mother, the Court ignored her interest
in the proceeding altogether. It was not the mother, but the state,
as parens patriae, which had an interest in "providing care to its
citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for
themselves" and the state which had the "police power to protect
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are
mentally ill."'"' The Court, therefore, simply weighed these interests
of the state and Addington's interest in avoiding commitment, determined that the latter was greater than the former, and adjusted
the burden of proof in the commitment hearing accordingly.
In Parham v. JR., the Court's recognition of parental interest,
based on the Constitution, tradition, and state statute, distorted
judicial analysis at each of the three levels of the Mathews v.
Eldridge test. As a consequence, Parham v. J.R. is an intelligible,
doctrinal exposition of neither due process nor children's rights.
Nonetheless, in distinguishing this case from that line of cases beginning with Danforth"' and leading most recently to Belotti v.
Baird (Belotti H), "I it is essential to note the impact that parental
156. 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
157. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
158. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also, Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2502; Addington v.
Texas, 99 S. Ct. at 1809; Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
159. 99 S. Ct. at 1809.
160. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
161. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979), [hereinafter cited as Bellotti 1, to differentiate it from Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976)]. In Bellotti I the Supreme Court directed the district court to
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interest had on the Court, as it worked its way through the Mathews
v. Eldridge formula.
The Court first conceded that the child had a "protectible interest
not only in being free of unnecessary bodily restraints, but also in
not being labeled erroneously because of an improper decision by
the state hospital superintendent." ' The Court then added that
this interest was "inextricably linked with the parents' interest in
and obligation for the welfare and health of the child ."" Due process, then, required that any procedure used by the state must
accommodate at the same time the private interests of both the
parent and the child. In this sense, the parents' interests were given
a constitutional status comparable to that of the child. The Court
found yet another source of parental authority over children. It was
alluded to by Chief Justice Burger in such expressions as "the parents' traditional interests," "Western Civilization concepts of the
family," and "American tradition." ' 4 This parental interest received substantive due process protection, as the Court suggested
it could only be burdened by preadmission hearings where the state
"perceives that parents and a child may be at odds, but nothing in
the constitution compels such procedures." ' Consequently, the
child's interest was negated by the recognition of a countervailing
private interest at the first step of the Mathews v. Eldridge test.
The second step of the Mathews formula is a determination of the
"risk of erroneous deprivation" of the child's liberty through parental commitment without judicial involvement, the Court relied
again on "those pages of human experience that teach that parents
generally do act in the child's best interests."" This presumption
permitted the Court to relax, if not remove entirely, any due process
certify to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts questions concerning the meaning of
the abortion consent statute, because of the possibility that the court might interpret the
statute in a way which rendered it constitutional. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's opinion appears in Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977).
In Bellotti II the United States Supreme Court found the statute, as interpreted by the
Massachusetts court, unconstitutional.
162. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
163. Id. at 2503.
164. Id. at 2504.
165. Id. at 2508 n.18.
166. Id. at 2504.
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protection from potential parental despotism. The Court added that
an adversarial hearing prior to the admission of the child, apart
from being presumably unnecessary to protect the child, would also
trespass on or inhibit the exercise of the parental prerogative to seek
treatment for the child." 7 Children in the custody of a state agency
were determined by the majority to be subject to an analagous
presumption that the agency will act in their best interests, and
therefore, the risk of inappropriate hospitalization was negligible.'6 8
Third, the state has a "'parenspatriae interest in helping parents
care for the mental health of their children," which would be in
jeopardy "if the parents are unwilling to take advantage of opportunities because the admission process is too onerous, too embarassing or too contentious."' It is at this point that parental authority
was handled by the Court in a manner roughly consistent with
Danforth and Belotti H. The Court found that the state has a legitimate interest in fostering parental authority and that interest must
be weighed against the child's private interests in avoiding the confinement and stigma of commitment. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens found this state interest alone sufficient to allow parents initially to admit their children to state hospitals without a
hearing. The district court, in requiring a pre-admission hearing had
also viewed parental commitment as an exercise of state authority.
It also made a factual determination that the risk of injury to the
child in a parental commitment was greater than one might suppose
from just a study of Blackstone, or "those pages of human experience," cited by Chief Justice Burger, 70 and required a preadmission hearing. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would
have required a similar hearing both at the pre-admission stage,
where the state interest in maintaining family harmony is not present, as in commitments of children by state agencies, and at the
post-admission stage where the family was intact.'
167. Id. at 2505. Since the parents were not really parties to the action, it should not have

been necessary for the Court to reach this issue.
168. Id. at 2512. The Court's decision might have been much different if it had first
analyzed commitments of children by agencies and then had analogized them to commitments by parents.

169. Id. at 2505:
170. Id. at 2504.
171. Id. at 2522 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In Belotti II, "I decided subsequent to Parham v. J.R., the Court
examined a Massachusetts statute1 3 which required that a minor
seeking an abortion obtain either (1) parental consent, or (2) judicial consent if parental consent was requested and denied and notice
was given to the parents. Judicial consent could be withheld regardless of the minor's maturity. The Court, with the exception of Justice White, thought the judicial consent procedure violated the due
process clause because it did not provide access to the court without
notice to the parents, and it permitted the court to deny an abortion
to a minor it found. mature and competent enough to decide for
herself whether abortion was in her best interests.
Admitting that abortion is a "constitutional right.

. .

of unique

character," ' it is still surprising that the Court in Parhamv. J.R.
failed to employ that approach to the problems of minority status.
This approach recognized a state authority by a statutory definition
of minority and other enactments to apportion decision-making
power between parents and minors -so defined. Justice Powell remarked in an illuminating footnote to the Belotti II opinion:
The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parental authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the
State generally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary,
criteria such as age limits, marital status, or membership in the
armed forces for lifting some or all of the legal disabilities of minority.
Not only is it difficult to define, let alone determine, maturity, but
the fact that a minor may be very much an adult in some respects
does not mean that his need and opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended. As discussed in the text,
however, the peculiar nature of the abortion decision requires the
opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the matufity of pregnant
minors.175
Applying this perspective to the problem of parental commitment, the Court might well have reached the conclusion that there
172. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
173. MASs. ANN. LAws, ch. 112, § 12S. (Cum. Supp. 1978), cited inperinentpart at 99 S.
Ct. 3039.
174. 99 S. Ct. at 3047.
175. Id. at 3048 n.23.
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must be a case-by-case determination of maturity in state hospital
admissions of minors. Furthermore, where the child is determined
to be mature enough to refuse consent to admission, the state must
either respect that decision, regardless of what it or the parents
determine to be in the "best interests" of the child, or seek to involuntarily commit the child on the same standards as an adult. This
conclusion is not by any means compelled by Belotti II, but it certainly is more consistent with that opinion. Moreover, it is conceivable that just such a case-by-case determination of maturity will be
required by the Court if, in a future case, it considers the question
not of what the procedure the child is entitled to before being admitted to the hospital, but of what procedure the child is entitled to
justify his continued detention.
A critical distinction, then, between Parham v. J.R. and the
Danforth-BelottiH line of cases is the Court's curious application
in Parham v. JR. of the Mathews v. Eldridge test, factoring in at
every stage, a parental interest distinct, at least in part, from any
governmental interest in promoting family integrity. This distinction contributed to, but does not wholly account for, the apparently
different outcomes of these cases. Probably that difference cannot
be explained entirely, but it is further elucidated by examining the
Court's view of the role of the physician, who with the child decides
on an abortion, and with the parent decides on the child's institutionalization.
C.

Medical Due Process: The Physician as Neutral Factfinder

Despite the Court's paen to parental supremacy in Parham v.
JR., it did conclude that,
the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child
institutionalized for mental health care is sufficiently great that some
kind of inquiry should be made by a "neutral factfinder" to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied.
[Citations omitted.] That inquiry must carefully probe the child's
background using all available sources, including, but not limited to,
parents, schools and other social agencies. Of course, the review must
also include an interview with the child. It is necessary that the
decisionmaker have the authority to refuse to admit any child who
does not satisfy the medical standards for admission. Finally, it is
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necessary that the child's continuing need for commitment be reviewed periodically by a similarly independent procedure. [Footnote
omitted.]"'
This in itself was not very controversial. The pre-admission hearing after notice to the child, required by the district court, 77 would
involve much the same "inquiry." But not only did the Chief Justice
find a pre-admission hearing unnecessary, he also carefully emphasized that the neutral factfinder could be, and perhaps ought to be,
a staff physician at the state hospital "so long as he or she is free to
evaluate independently the child's mental and emotional condition
7
and need for treatment" and refuse inappropriate admissions.
The Court did not justify the designation of the staff physician
as decisionmaker by the low risk of error it perceived in parental
commitments. Instead; it seemed to say that a physician provided
more protection to the child than a judge could. The Court based
this conclusion on the assumptions that in commitment "the questions are essentially medical in character" and that the "mode and
procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of
judges." Furthermore, the presence of a judge at a commitment
hearing provided no real protection to the person proposed for a
7 9
commitment.
The first assumption, that commitment is merely a medical issue,
is far from uhiversally accepted. One author has usefully summarized a different and equally respectable perspective on mental illness:
No single bit of behavior (or symptom) can be considered deviant
or mentally ill. The crucial factor is the social context in which the
behavior occurs. The same behavior may, depending upon the situation, be considered socially acceptable, mentally ill, or criminal (indicating another method of social control.)
For example, an adolescent who commits a car theft may confess
to a policeman, be called a juvenile delinquent and be jailed. He may
instead consult a psychiatrist and then he is likely to be labeled
176.
177.
178.
179.

Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2506.
J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 140 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
Id. at 2507-08.
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mentally ill and receive psychotherapy, or he may tell only his friends
and be considered a hero. The label and the social reactor to deviance
depend greatly upon who observes the deviance.'
J.L. and J.R., the plaintiff class representatives, had been admitted with diagnosis of "hyperkinetic reactions to childhood" and
"unsocialized, aggressive reaction to childhood," respectively.',
The possibility that they could have been called "delinquents,"
"status offenders," or just playful boys instead makes the decisionmaker's neutrality seem somewhat more important than his medical degree."'2 The Court refused to find the medical profession per
se lacking in neutrality regarding commitment and left the issue
open to an individual determination on remand to the district court
as to each member of the plaintiff class.es
The assumption that judges in general have no business making
medical decisions might also be made in adult commitment cases,
personal injury suits, or patent litigation, but it is not. The assumption that judicial hearings provide less procedural protection than
medical screenings might well be correct if the judges in those hearings gave as much credence to medical opinion as Chief Justice
Burger did.""
The weight given to medical judgment is the single point of resemblance between Parham v. JR., and the abortion opinions. In
Roe v. Wade 185 and Doe v. Bolton,' the Court had not left the
abortion decision in the first trimester entirely with the woman
180. Zusman, Society and Mental Illness, 15 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY, 635, 636 (1966).
181. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2497-98. The recently completed AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed. 1979) (DSMIII) would classify these "illnesses" as "314.Ox Attention Disorder Hyperactivity" and
"312.Ox Undersocialized Conduct Disorder, Agressive Type," respectively, without indicating why they are "illnesses" rather than misconduct.
182. And from Zusman's perspective, supra note 180, the fact that the decisionmaker is a
physician alone precludes neutrality.
183. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2511.
184. The reluctance of defense counsel to cross-examine physician witnesses also contributes to both the ineffectiveness of the hearing and the heavy reliance by the courts on medical
opinion. See, e.g., Cohen, The Functionof the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill,
44 TEx. L. Rav. 424 (1966) cited by the Court at 99 S. Ct. 2508, at n.17. See also Slobogin,
supra note 75.
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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seeking it. In that stage of pregnancy the Court had only said that
"the abortion decision and its effectuation must be.left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.' ' 87 In
Danforth, one constitutional defect in the challenged statute was
that it imposed in all cases a parental consent provision "exercisable
by a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and [did] so without
sufficient justification for the restriction."' 8 In Belotti II, the Court,
to the extent that it recognized the need for parental involvement
in an immature minor's abortion decision, did so because of the
danger that the child, because of her immaturity, might not select
a competent physician.'8 9 When the minor was determined on a
case-by-case basis to be mature, the abortion decision was hers to
make, not alone, but "in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes.""' The Supreme Court's opinions on
abortion may be read loosely not as providing pregnant women with
a substantive due process right to abortion in the first trimester but
as appointing the private physician as the neutral decision-maker
controlling the woman's access to an abortion. In this light, medical
consultation becomes a substitute for procedural due process.
In Parhamv. J.R., the Court gave the physician no less autonomy
in parental commitments than in abortion decisions. The Court in
Parham v. J.R. ignored the real possibility that the physician's
neutrality is endangered in commitment because of the necessity of
serving three masters at once: the child, the parents, and the
state-the last both as an employee and an agent of social control.
Perhaps the Court ignored this possibility because the Court's
"medical due process" required much more than just an assurance
that the staff physician at the state hospital made the ultimate
determination of "whether the child is mentally or emotionally ill
and whether he can benefit from the treatment that is provided by
the state.""' Due process required, in addition to the presence of a
187. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164. See also, id. at 166 ("the abortion decision in all its
aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must
rest with the physician").
188. 428 U.S. at 75.
189. 99 S. Ct. at 3047, n.21.
190. Id. at 3048.
191. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
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neutral factfinder at the gates of the state hospital, a lengthy screening process beginning in the community and continuing after admission to the hospital.
The narrow holding of Parham v. J.R. was only that "Georgia's
general administrative and statutory scheme for the voluntary commitment of children is not per se unconstitutional.'

19 2

It is possible

on remand that the district court will find that some members of
the plaintiff class of children did not receive adequate medical
screening before admission. And it is possible that the district court
could find that, distinct from admission, continued detention requires more than medical screening.
The standard of screening which must be met by Georgia on
remand or by another state with a similar parental commitment
statute, was set forth with great care by the Court:
In the typical case the parents of a child initially conclude from the
child's behavior that there is some emotional problem- in short, that
"something is wrong." They may respond to the problem in various
ways, but generally the first contact with the State occurs when they
bring the child to be examined by psychologist or phychiatrist at a
community mental health clinic.
Most often, the examination is followed by outpatient treatment
at the community clinic. In addition, the child's parents are encouraged, and sometimes required, to participate in a family therapy
program to obtain a better insight into the problem. In most instances, this is all the care a child requires. However, if, after a period of
outpatient care, the child's abnormal emotional condition persists, he
may be referred by the local clinic staff to an affiliated regional mental hospital.
At the regional hospital an admissions team composed of a psychiatrist and at least one other mental health professional examines and
interviews the child-privately in most instances. This team then
examines the medical records provided by the clinic staff and interviews the parents. Based on this information, and any additional
background that can be obtained, the admissions team makes a diagnosis and determines whether the child will likely benefit from institutionalized care. If the team finds either condition not met, admission is refused.
192. Id. at 2511.
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If the team admits a child as suited for hospitalization, the child's
condition and continuing need for hospital care are reviewed periodically by at least one independent, medical review group. For the most
part, the reviews are as frequent as weekly, but none are less often
than once every two months. Moreover, as we noted earlier the superintendent of each hospital is charged with an affirmative statutory
duty to discharge any child who is no longer mentally ill or in need
of therapy.' 3
To the extent that a state deviates from this standard, Parham
v. J.R. provides no protection from due process challenges not even
with regard to the initial admission of the child. To the extent that
the Court seriously believes that "the supposed protections of an
adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical
decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real,""' it is possible
to argue that due process requires such a medical sc:xeening procedure, or its equivalent. This is possible even in states such as Virginia, where minors who are unable or unwilling to seek voluntary
admission to a mental hospital cannot be detained without a judicial order based on probable cause, and in addition are entitled to
a full adversarial hearing before a juvenile and domestic relations
judge usually within forty-eight hours of initial detention.'9 ,
The constitutional adequacy of the screening process adopted by
the state seems unrelated to whether the state formally implements
screening by statute. In Georgia, screening practices varied from
hospital to hospital, and from case to case. Therefore, on remand,
the district court is left with immense factual issues to resolve.
Almost two years earlier, the California Supreme 'Court in In re
Roger S., 98 decided that a strong mandatory screening procedure" 7
193. Id. at 2510.
194. Id. at 2508.
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); but see § 16.1-275 (Cum. Supp.
1979), discussed supra at note 90 and accompanying text.
196. 19 Cal.3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
197. California's rough equivalent to Virginia's Chapter 10 of Title 37.1, discussed supra
at note 77, provides that: "No mentally disordered person shall be admitted to a state
hospital prior to screening and referral by an agency designated by the county Short-Doyle
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provided inadequate procedural due process to a fourteen year old
boy admitted pursuant to a parental commitment statute."' 5 The
California court found that
the present screening procedure does not offer an adequate forum in
which to resolve either the disputed questions of fact, upon which.the
psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness or disorder may rest in part,
or conflicting medical opinions as to whether the minor is mentally
ill or disordered and in need of treatment.' 99
During the pre-admission screening process in California a physician had concluded that Roger S. was "clearly not pyschotic," but
a psychologist had concluded that Roger S. was "pyschotic." Two
other physicians recommended that Roger S. not be confined. Nonetheless, he was placed in a building at the state hospital, described
by the court as having "barred windows and locked doors in an open
ward with 40 other minors some of whom are so severely disturbed
that they are unable to dress themselves.121 °1 While the state hospital performed post-admission evaluation of Roger S. after referral by
the community mental health center, there was no "neutral factfinder" in the pre-admission screening who might have resolved
conflicts of lay or expert facts. Had California's screening practices
included the provision of a neutral factfinder at the pre-admission
stage, it is possible that the In re Roger S. court would not have
required a hearing before children of Roger's age or older were admitted on parental request.20 '
The Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R. discovered constitutional
plan to provide this service." CAL. WELi. & INST.

CODE

§ 5601 (Supp. 1978). This mandates

a "single portal of entry" through the community mental health center to the state hospital.
198. 19 Cal.3d at 936, 569 P.2d at 1295, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. The California Supreme Court carefully explained that children of the age of Roger
S., unlike adults, and like parolees and probationers, were not entitled to a judicial hearing,
because their liberty was conditional even outside the institution. Since the parent already
controlled the child's liberty, when a parent sought to commit the child, an administrative
hearing, with a lower burden of proof, and a standard of commitment less than that of
"imminently dangerous" or "gravely disabled," would suffice constitutionally. Id. at 309. The
real distinction between Parham v. J.R. and this case lies in the latter's requirement that
counsel be provided for the minor in the administrative hearing. 19 Cal.3d at 938-39, 569 P.2d
at 1296-97, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09.
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dimensions in a procedure which long has been the focus of federal
financial support to state and local mental health programs. Screening persons proposed for placement in state hospitals is a condition
of receiving Community Mental Health grants2 2 and Public Health
Service formula grants for manpower training.2 03 Enforcement of the
condition by the federal government through its funding agency, the
National Institute of Mental Health, is probably, however, nonexistent. If state legislatures follow Chief Justice Burger's lead, the
screening of state hospital admissions, at least those of children, will
become even more critical to the elimination of inappropriate admissions, a primary goal of this federal legislation, since the courts
no longer will be interposed between the prospective patient and the
hospital. Of course, in those states which permit parental commitments, the provision of pre-admission screening will be demanded
not just by the fine print in a federal grant, but also by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Chief Justice's
program of pre-admission screening will divert fewer dollars from
treatment, as he assumed it would, than the brief judicial hearing
sought by the plaintiffs. Questions of fairness aside., the cost of a
hearing, or even hundreds of hearings, is less than the economic and
social cost of inappropriately institutionalizing a single child. Moreover, screening sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process
202. The Community Mental Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2689(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1978),
provides in pertinent part:
Beginning on the date the community mental health center is established for the
purposes of this title, the services provided through the center shall include(ii) assistance to courts and other public agencies in screening residents of the
center's catchment area who are being considered for referral to a State mental health
facility for inpatient treatment to determine if they should be so referred and provision,
where appropriate, of treatment for such persons through the center as an alternative
to inpatient treatment at such a facility . ...
203. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 246(g)(2)(D)(iii) (1978), provides in pertinent
part:
the State mental health authority will(iii) provide for assistance to courts and other public agencies and to appropriate
private agencies to facilitate (I) screening by community mental health centers (or, if
there are no such centers, other appropriate entities) of residents cof the State who are
being considered for inpatient care in a mental health facility to determine if such care
is necessary . . ..

19791

Posw-Parham

735

REMEDIES

encompasses initial treatment, including family therapy, at a community mental health center, and then referral to "an admission
team composed of a psychiatrist and at least one other mental
health professional" at the state hospital who must at least interview the child, review records, and interview the parents, before
making an admission decision. It is difficult to believe that this
"medical due process" is less costly to the state than the judicial
due process sought by the plaintiffs in Parham v. J.R.
D.

Questions Unanswered in Parham v. J.R.

No less dismaying to lawyers representing children than the broad
and imprecise rhetoric about parental rights in Parham v. JR., is

the narrowness of the majority's holding. Assuming Georgia met the
Court's standard of medical screening, then, the Court held, it could
admit a child to a state hospital without a hearing. This much the
Court had already suggested was constitutionally permissible, in its
summary affirmance in Briggs v. Arafeh."4 At least three members
204. 411 U.S. 911 (1973), aff'g summarily Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn.
1972) (upholding a statute which permitted involuntary hospitalization on a medical certification alone, provided that if the patient objected a judicial hearing would be held within
forty-five days). See also, Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D, N.J. 1976) (three-judge
court) (permitting twenty day delay in holding hearing); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp.
430, 437 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (authorizing forty-five day respite care admission for mentally
retarded children without hearing); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972) (permitting up to twenty-five day delay in hearing). Recent
statistics obtained from the Virginia Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
suggest that most recent involuntary commitments in Virginia are of so short a term that a
hearing might not be necessary if Briggs is good law and the statistics are accurate. For the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1979, the mean length of stay in the state's institutions was:
Total Number
of Admissions

Mean Length of Stay
(In Days)

< 18

139

18.81

> 18

71

14.93

< 18

201

27.86

> 18

4154

14.59

Age
MR Admissions
Other Than
By Self
MH Involuntary
Admissions by
Civil Court
Order

This data also discloses 280 juvenile admissions during this period with an admitting legal
status described by the Department as "Voluntary-Parent" with a mean length of stay of
20.15 days. Presumably these admissions were based on the consent of the parent and the

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:695

of the Court, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, would require more than medical screening to continue the confinement of
a child after admission.2

5

1

Justice Stewart would permit the state to

avoid any procedural safeguard before or after adraission.06 The
remainder of the Court gave no dependable indication of when and
how much post-admission procedural protection is required.
In approving Georgia's parental commitment procedure, the
Court also ignored the issue of the mature minor. Apparently a
parental admission need not be refused if the neutral factfinder
determines that the child is mature enough to make the admissions
decision himself, but it is less clear whether, in the Court's view, a
mature minor has a right to admit himself to a hospital without
parental consent,2 7 or whether after admission a mature minor may
2 8
refuse (or consent to) any kind of treatment.

It is difficult to believe from Chief Justice Burger's opinion and°
21
his reliance on Meyer v. Nebraska,2 9 Pierce v. Society of Sisters
and Wisconsin v. Yoder,2 11 that Parham v. J.R. was not a case of
parents challenging a state statute which required a pre-admission
hearing before they could put their child in a state hospital. In fact,
however, the Court was quite ready to permit a state to interpose
such hearings-between the child and his institutionalization where
212
the state "perceives that parents and a child may be at odds.

And where this conflict rises to the level of abuse or neglect, it is
certain that the Court's calculus of due process would produce a
child in compliance with Departmental Instruction No. 60, discussed at notes 32-33 supra and
accompanying text.
205. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2515 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
206. Id. at 2515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
207. In re Roger S., supra note 196, is an example of a decision that recognized rights which
existed in a category of minors over a certain age, in that case 14 years cf age, which did not
exist in younger children. Danforth and Bellotti II contemplated the determination of maturity on a case-by-case basis, but there the Court was dealing with necesoarily older children.
The best exposition of the arguments made to and ignored by the Court for a mature minor
rule, and its basis in developmental psychology, appears in Amicus Brief of the Child Welfare
League of America at 71, Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
208. Discussed briefly at note 94 supra and accompanying text.
209. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
210. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
211. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
212. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2508 n.18.
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different result, requiring without doubt little or no deference to
parental interests in commitment, and probably more than medical
screening. Thus, states that wish to continue parental commitments
after Parham v. JR., and that meet the Court's high standards for
medical screening, may continue to risk'challenges to constitutional
sufficiency of that process, where screening turns up evidence of
abuse or neglect-a risk greatly increased by vague definitions of
abuse and neglect and mandatory reporting requirements typical of
213
most state statutes.
Finally, the Court in Parham v. JR. declined to consider the
doctrine of the least restrictive alternative. It misconstrued the district court's order that the state create a treatment alternative for
some members of the plaintiff class who could be treated optimally
outside of the state hospitals. The Supreme Court understood this
measure as a response to the deprivation of procedural due process
in admitting the children rather than, as it was, relief to those
children who, independent of the way in which they reached the
21 4
hospital were being harmed by this continued confinement there.
Since the Suprme Court found the admission procedure adequate,
it reasoned that it need not consider the remedy of ordering less
restrictive treatment, although it suggested that it would not in any
case be appropriate for a procedural deprivation.2 15 Presumably this
issue is open for the district court on remand to consider independently of those regarding adequacy of medical screening. 21
Judge Broderick, it will be remembered, in dissenting from the
district court opinion in Bartley v. Kremens, called the provision of
procedural safeguards to children whom parents wanted to institutionalize an "overdose of due process," a dissent followed closely by
213. An argument might be made that inappropriate institutionalization alone could constitute neglect thus triggering reporting duties on the part of the hospital staff and court
intervention.
214. Justice Brennan briefly alludes to the potential harm to the plaintiffs. Parham v. J.R.,
99 S. Ct. at 2517 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215. Id. at 2513 n.23.
216. Chief Justice Burger complained that "the [district] court made no findings on this
issue" while at the same time acknowledging that the 46 members of the plaintiff class were
"found to be treatable in 'less drastic' settings." Id. One would think that, in the context of
expert opinion, that failure to treat in the least restrictive setting is comparable to harming
the children, and that this would be a sufficient finding.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:695

Chief Justice Burger in Parham v. JR.. Nonetheless, when Judge
Broderick in Halderman v. Pennhurst27 addressed the substantive
rights of persons within a large institution for the mentally retarded
in Pennsylvania, his response was to order community placement of
all residents and the closing of the institution thereafter. 21 8 In
Parham v. J.R. there are no reliable indications of how the Court
would react if on remand the district court rather than prescribing
an "overdose of due process," adopted the more far-reaching remedy fashioned by Judge Broderick in Halderman v. Pennhurst.
IV.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR VIRGINIA LAW

Examined in the light of Parhamv. J.R., current Virginia procedures for involuntary commitment are constitutionally sufficient,
though susceptible to considerable improvement within the parameters implied by the Court. A wholesale replacement of existing
statutory safeguards of notice, hearing, and appointed counsel with
the Court's recommended medical screening process would not be
an improvement. That screening process is of doubtful constitutional sufficiency in cases involving child abuse or neglect, continuing detention, mature minors, or deprivation of educational opportunities, all of which are circumstances the Court, perhaps incorrectly, felt were missing in Parham v. J.R. The introduction of any
of these factors almost surely would alter the measure of procedural
due process the Court would extend to a minor in commitment to a
state hospital. Virginia legislators instead ought to retain the existing statutory procedures for informed voluntary,2 1 formal voluntary,220 and involuntary 2 ' admissions of minors to itate hospitals,
but should preface those procedures with a medical screening process which would permit some children to be treated just on the
consent of a parent or guardian, and without judicial involvement,
and, for other children, for whom a hearing is appropriate, provide
the court with better data on which to base a commit;ment decision.
217. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (appeals argued before the Third Circuit (in banc)
September 6, 1979).
218. Id. at 1327.
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
220. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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The following statutory language might achieve both of those objectives:
§ 37.1-70.1 Admission of persons under the age of eighteen for
screening.(a) Any community mental health and mental retardation services
program established under § 37.1-194, or any other facility specifically authorized by regulations duly adopted by the Board, 222 may
admit as an outpatient 2 3 and treat any person under the age of eigh-

teen, upon the request of his parent or legal guardian, provided that
within twenty-four hours of admission, a physician or clinical psychologist2M certifies in writing that:
(1) the person is mentally ill or mentally retarded and will
benefit from services currently available in the program;
(2) the person is incapable of making an informed decision to
seek or refuse such services;m
(3) there is no reason to believe after investigation that the
person has been subjected to abuse or neglect as defined in §
16.1-228;n and
222. The Virginia Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation is controlled by
a board of directors, called the State Mental Health and Mental Retardation Board. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 37.1-2 (Repl. Vol. 1976), 37.1-10 (Cum. Supp. 1979), and 37.1-39 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
There are nine such directors, all unsalaried, and appointed by the governor. § 37.1-4 (Repl.
Vol. 1976). The Board presently has broad authority to adopt regulations, § 37.1-20 (Repl.
Vol. 1976), and specific authority to adopt pre-screening regulations, § 37.1-70 (Repl. Vol.
1976).
223. As in the final paragraph of VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979) regulations
might broaden this to include "day treatment in a hospital, night treatment in a hospital
...or other such appropriate treatment modalities" as are less restrictive than institutional
confinement.
224. The Virginia Code already recognizes the propriety of such evaluations by clinical
psychologists of persons alleged to be mentally retarded, VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1979), and children in general, VA. CoDE ANN. § 16.1-275 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
225. There would seem to be no reazon to suppose that the capacity to consent to treatment
is not commensurate with the capacity to refuse. In Melville v. Sabbatino, 30 Conn. Supp.
320, 313 A.2d 886, 889 (1973) where the state authorized the voluntary admission of minors
between the ages of 16 and 18, the court held that it followed logically that those minors could
also sign themselves out of the hospital, regardless of parental wishes. The district court in
Danforth had also reasoned that since parents could not force a minor to have an abortion,
they also could not stop her from seeking an abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392
F. Supp. 1362, 1376 (E.D. Mo. 1975). Both these cases relied on In re Smith, 16 Md. App.
209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972). Nonetheless, legislatures continue to create room for distinguishing
between the right to refuse treatment and the right to consent. See note 3 supra.
226. Evidence of abuse or neglect would take the detention of the child beyond the scope
of Parham v. J.R. See note 213 supra and accompanying text.
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(4) there is no reason to believe after consultation with school
authorities that such services will deny the person an appropriate education.m

(b) Any hospital or training center may admit as an inpatient and
treat for a period not to exceed fifteen consecutive days or thirty days
within one year any person under the age of eighteen, upon the request of his parent or legal guardian, provided that prior to admission, a physician or clinical psychologist certifies that in addition to
the foregoing conditions in (a), the following additional conditions are
also met:
(1) the person has received within the last thirty days services
including, where appropriate, family therapy in the program or
approved facility, but requires further services (which shall be
specified) available in no less restrictive setting than the2hospital or the training center to which admission is sought; 1
(2) the program or approved facility has recommended such
inpatient admission and has prepared a plan for the eventual
discharge of the person from the hospital or training center and
the post-discharge provision of services to the person by that
program or approved facility;
(3) another physician or clinical psychologist independently
has reviewed all the foregoing conditions and found them to be
satisfied.
(c) No judge shall issue an order regarding a person under the age
of eighteen under § 37.1-65.1, § 37.1-67.1 or § 37.1-3,21 until he has
received a written report from a community mental health and mental retardation services program, or approved facility which certifies
that
(1) such person was admitted and treated pursuant to (a) and
(b) and continues to be mentally ill or mentally retarded and
in need of institutional services; or
227. See note 42 supra.
228. Such a requirement enables the court to make a better informed decision as to the
existence of alternatives to institutional confinement in an involuntary commitment hearing
under VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979) or a certification hearing under § 37.165.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
229. This could perhaps be expanded to include any order resulting in detention under VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-275 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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(2) admission and treatment pursuant to both (a) and (b) were
sought but denied or terminated because one or more conditions
therein were not satisfied (which condition shall be specified);
and
(3) any additional pre-admission screening procedures required by regulations duly adopted by the Board pursuant to its
authority in § 37.1-70 have been complied with.

Such a statute permits parents or a legal guardian to obtain outpatient or short term inpatient treatment for a child. Judicial intervention is triggered only where such treatment has failed, or for
specified reasons, has been found inappropriate, at which point the
court should be in a better position to weigh the merits of institutionalization. At the same time that such a procedure accommodates the parental interests elaborated in Parham v. J.R., it also
0
enhances the procedural protection provided to the child.2
V.

CONCLUSION

The medical screening process endorsed by Chief Justice Burger
in Parham v. J.R. permits states to relax, or at least delay, the
provision of adversarial-style procedural safeguards for children
whose parents or guardian seek to commit to a state hospital, absent
indications of child abuse or neglect. This medical screening process
can, in addition to facilitating parental access to hospital services,
improve judicial decision-making in those cases where medical
screening alone may not be sufficient to provide procedural due
process protection to the liberty interests of a minor.
230. This is accomplished principally by insuring that the court, the defense counsel, and

the court-appointed physician or clinical psychologist receives better data on the grounds for
institutionalization.

